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MUNICIPAL GONE DISTRICT: JURISDICTION IN NEW
COURT OF FIRST RESORT
Vic Fleming*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1957, as federal troops rolled into Arkansas to quell local unrest
over the Little Rock Central High School racial integration crisis, a
high profile billboard posed the question: "Who will build Arkansas if
her own people do not?"' During the next few years, a question of
similar spirit will arise: "Who will rebuild Arkansas's judiciary if her
own lawyers and judges do not?"
The voters have done their part. Motivated by the promise of non-
partisan elections, the year 2000 electorate enacted "An Amendment
to the Arkansas Constitution to Revise the Judicial Article,"2 now
known as Amendment 80. This measure brought about a long-heralded
merger of law and equity at the circuit court level and rescinded party
primaries for the judiciary as a whole. It also provided a cutting board
for the inferior court system-for changes in name, jurisdiction, and
venue.
Amendment 803 establishes "district courts" as "trial courts of
limited jurisdiction."4 These courts "shall have the jurisdiction vested
* Vic Fleming is a judge for the Little Rock District Court, Second Division.
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Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court and currently Circuit Judge for the 17th Judicial
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1. Editorial, One Step Forward... and Two Back, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug.
20, 2001, at 4B.
2. On the ballot as "Amendment 3" and originally introduced as Senate Joint
Resolution 9 in the 1999 Regular Session of the Arkansas General Assembly, this
initiated amendment is now Amendment 80 of the Arkansas Constitution. See ARK.
CONST. amend. 80.
3. ARK. CONST. amend. 80. This amendment became effective on July 1, 2001. Id.
§21.
4. Id. § 7(A).
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in" municipal, corporation, police, and justice of the peace courts, and
courts of common pleas "at the time this Amendment takes effect [and]
shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and
other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005."'
Moreover, "Municipal Court Judges in office [on July 1, 2001,] shall
continue in office through December 31, 2004."6
To resolve potential ambiguities, the 2001 General Assembly
enacted legislation making the name "district court" effective July 1,
2001,' and specifying that district courts "shall have the jurisdiction
vested in the presently established municipal courts."8 Thus, jurisdic-
tion conferred in Amendment 80 is effective in 2005. Jurisdiction
conferred pursuant to Amendment 80 will be effective then or later,
according to the language of conferring statutes or rules. By pre-
existing law, the legislature may make other jurisdictional changes
before 2005, but in each instance a valid inquiry will be whether
Amendment 80 superseded the enabling law.
Amendment 80 may have settled a century of controversy in the
area of inferior courts' "territorial jurisdiction." It may also have
provided a foundation to shore up weaknesses in other areas. Inferior
court jurisdiction, as mundane a topic as it may seem, merits corner-
stone status in any discussion of the judiciary that Arkansas is about to
reconstruct. The long-running dispute, which played itself out in cases
from 1915 through 1996, is whether people stopped for traffic offenses
or arrested in one town with an inferior court may properly be cited
into a court of a different town. This type of filing has never been held
defective, but it has lacked solid judicial backing.
Municipal (now district) courts are said to have countywide
jurisdiction (except in ten counties that contain two judicial districts,
in which jurisdiction is "limited to the district in which the court is
situated").9
5. Id. § 19(B)(2).
6. Id. § 19(A)(3).
7. Act of Apr. 17, 2001, No. 1693, 2001 Ark. Acts 1693, secs. 1, 3 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-132 (LEXIS Supp. 2001)).
8. Id. at sec. 1 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-132(a)(1)(A)).
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-206(b) (LEXIS Repl. 1999). "The jurisdiction of a
municipal court shall be coextensive with the county in which it is situated, except ...
in counties having two (2) judicial districts, the jurisdiction shall be limited to the
district in which the court is situated." Id. Arkansas counties that are divided into two
judicial districts are Sebastian, ARK. CONST. art. XIII, § 5; see ARK. CODE ANN. §16-13-
2002 (LEXIS Repl. 1999); Prairie, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-16-719 (LEXIS Repl. 1999);
see id. § 16-13-2502 (LEXIS RepI. 1999); Clay, Craighead, and Mississippi, see id. § 16-
13-1002 (LEXIS Repl. 1999); Lawrence, see id. § 16-13-1102 (LEXIS Repl. 1999);
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By the thinnest of margins, a majority of the Arkansas Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that, when a defendant is arrested in one
town and sent to court in another, the issue is venue, not jurisdiction. The
court has never actually reached a constitutional argument raised by
allegedly aggrieved parties, though the equal protection issue has been
discussed more than once. This issue will undoubtedly be revisited as
Amendment 80 endures an arduous implementation process.
Other issues that merit analysis include jurisdictional limitation on
felonies, which causes some cases unnecessarily to endure two dockets
before final disposition, and cases involving real estate liens, which are
statutorily precluded from disposition before judges who are fully
qualified to adjudicate them. Also meriting mention is Amendment
80's potential to resurrect the issue of whether jury trials should be
available at the inferior court level.
The legal profession in Arkansas would do well to take these
matters seriously. Amendment 80 was intended to fix some things in
"the system." Lawyers and judges are in the best position to ensure that
the repairs are properly implemented.
II. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE FOR CRIMINAL SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION
Whether a person arrested in an area served by one inferior court
may rightfully be haled into a different area's court has been debated
for years. Legislation, court rules, or both, pursuant to Amendment 80,
may resolve this question.
One reading of Amendment 80 is that, effective January 1, 2005,
district court judges' jurisdiction must be limited to offenses occurring
in the governmental unit ("district") that elects them, irrespective of
Franklin, see id. § 16-13-1302 (LEXIS Repl. 1999); Arkansas, see id. § 16-13-1902
(LEXIS Repl. 1999); and Logan and Yell, see id. § 16-13-2302 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
Subsequent references to "countywide" in this article mean "district-wide" where these
counties are concerned. See also id. §§ 16-17-119(c) (LEXIS Repl. 1999) (explaining
that governing bodies of cities in counties with over 25,000 residents may add
municipal court divisions, "each of which shall have jurisdiction coextensive with the
county"); 16-17-704 (LEXIS Repl. 1999) (stating that in civil cases, municipal courts
have original jurisdiction "coextensive with the county wherein the court is situated");
16-17-217, 16-19-401 (LEXIS Repl. 1999) (mandating that in townships having a
municipal court, justices of the peace "shall have original jurisdiction coextensive with
the county"). The same phrase, "coextensive with the county," is used to describe the
jurisdiction of the mayor, city, and police courts, but with the qualification that this
jurisdiction is as to "crimes and offenses committed within the limits of the city." See,
e.g., id. §§ 14-44-108, 14-45-106, 16-18-112 (Michie Repl. 1998 & LEXIS Supp. 2001).
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whether implementing legislation addresses this point. Another reading
is that Amendment 80 is not so clear on this point. Several sections of
Amendment 80 merit collective scrutiny for an understanding of the
issue. Before examining them, however, examining what has gone
before provides a context conducive to understanding the controversy.
A. Historical Overview
Courts have not been of one mind as to whether an inferior court
judge elected in one locality should be able to hear a criminal case
arising in a different locality, especially when the locality of the
offense is in a different county. A significant issue in this debate is the
question of forum-shopping. Criticism has been aimed directly at law
enforcement, for alleged improper forum-shopping,' ° and, less directly,
at the inferior courts themselves, for agreeing to hear cases. However,
prosecutors, who are ultimately responsible for where cases are filed,"
have been largely untouched by the controversy.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has discussed but never reached the
issue of whether abusive forum-shopping occurred. 12  A leading
dissenter in these cases, Justice Darrell Hickman, was squarely against
revenue-oriented court selection, though he never suggested that the
Attorney General, as chief law enforcement officer for the State, was
the appropriate official to curb allegedly improper practices. Whether
a directive from the prosecutor at the top of the chain of command
would have brought a halt to any actual abuses is open to speculation,
and conventional wisdom seems to be that an elected constitutional
10. No state law mandates that law enforcement officers who arrest a person lodge
the charges in a particular court. This statutory "silence" has resulted in agencies with
statewide and countrywide apprehension jurisdiction lodging charges in district courts
that, while having jurisdiction, are not necessarily in the area most closely associated
with the arrest.
11. Article VII, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 provided: "The
qualified electors of each circuit shall elect a prosecuting attorney." "Prosecuting
attorney" is defined as "any person legally elected, appointed, or otherwise designated
or charged . . . with the duty of prosecuting persons accused of crimes or traffic
offenses." ARK. R. CRIM. P. 1.6(b). It "includes, but is not limited to: (i) a prosecuting
attorney and any of his deputies or assistants; and (ii) a city attorney and any of his
deputies or assistants." Id. "Each prosecuting attorney shall commence and prosecute
all criminal actions in which the state or any county in his district may be concerned."
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-21-103 (LEXIS Repl. 1999). Prosecuting attorneys may designate
city attorneys to prosecute in municipal courts state misdemeanors occurring in the city.
Id. § 16-21-115 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
12. See infra note 138.
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officer would be unlikely to issue such a directive without a suggestion
from the majority of the court that such was appropriate.
The issue of a court's jurisdiction has deep historical roots. Article
VI, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution of 1836 provided that the
General Assembly might "vest such jurisdiction as may be deemed
necessary in municipal corporation courts. ' 3 The task of finding
specific legislative enactments creating any such courts was not a
productive endeavor, although several acts were found creating specific
towns and cities and vesting their mayors and aldermen with broad
comprehensive powers.' 4 As the nineteenth century wound down, laws
were enacted defining cities of the first and second class and vesting
them with powers 5 from which emerged mayor's courts,16 which were
distinguished from Justice of the Peace (JP) courts.
The historical status of JPs is a bit easier to grasp, as Gould's Digest
provided: "Justices of the Peace shall have power and jurisdiction
throughout their respective counties . . . to cause to be kept, all laws
made for the preservation of the peace [and] to cause to come before
them . . . persons who break the peace [or] attempt to break the
peace.' 7 Article VII, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution of 1868
provided: "In criminal causes the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
shall extend to all matters less than felony for final determination and
judgment."'"
In 1873, the General Assembly vested JPs with jurisdiction
''coextensive with the county."" Given that, by then, first class cities'
corporation courts already existed, the intent was that if a crime was
committed in the city, if the culprit were apprehended within the
county, it was the city court's case; if the crime was committed outside
13. ARK. CONST. of 1836 art. VI, § 1.
14. E.g., Act of Jan. 4, 1845, 1845 Ark. Acts (incorporating the towns of Van
Buren and Fort Smith).
15. See generally EDWARD W. GANTT, A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS ch.
72, §§ 3194-3219 (1874); W.W. MANSFIELD, A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS ch.
29, §§ 722-748 (1884).
16. In Harris v. State, a defendant was arrested and brought before the mayor, who
was held to have jurisdiction in the circumstances. 60 Ark. 209, 211, 29 S.W. 640, 641
(1895). In State ex. rel. Moose v. Woodruff, the Harris scenario was cited as an example
of a "corporation court [with] jurisdiction as an examining court within the city limits,"
making the point that a JP court was not required under Harris's facts. 120 Ark. 406,
413-14, 179 S.W. 813, 816 (1915).
17. JOSIAH GOULD, A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS ch. 99, part III, § 1
(1858).
18. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. VII, § 20.
19. Act of Apr. 29, 1873, No. 135, 1873 Ark. Acts 135, sec. 2.
2002)
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the city, it was the JP's case. The county line was actually the boundary
for "apprehension jurisdiction," for lack of a better phrase, for both
courts. The intent appears to have been that "countywide jurisdiction"
in the early 1900s meant that if city or county agents could catch a
criminal suspect before she reached the county line, then one court or
the other would be able to try her-the JP, if the offense had occurred
outside the city limits, the corporation court if the offense had occurred
within. 0
Apparently intending to carry this scheme forward, the Arkansas
Constitution of 1874 authorized the legislature to invest city corpora-
tion courts with jurisdiction "concurrent" with JPs.21 Under this grant
of authority, the 1915 General Assembly created for certain cities
(easily identifiable as Little Rock and Argenta, now North Little Rock)
"municipal courts."22 The judges of these courts were elected at "city
elections, 23 and jurisdiction was "co-extensive with the county. 24 In
State ex rel. Moose v. Woodruff,25 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the
legislature's power to give a court jurisdiction beyond the "geograph-
ical limits" of its town.26 Such jurisdiction has remained countywide,27
but not without being repeatedly litigated.
B. A Look at Case Law
A series of case vignettes may illustrate some of the complexities
of venue and jurisdiction. As will be seen, venue is and should be the
real issue in every case where a person is apprehended in one place and
then cited into another for trial, as long as the move is intra-county. As
also will be seen, however, jurisdiction is a concept that will not go
away.
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-18-112(b)(2) (LEXIS Supp. 2001) ("For crimes
and offenses committed within the limits of the city, the mayor's jurisdiction shall be
coextensive with the county.")
21. ARK. CONST. of 1874 art. VIII, § 43.
22. Act of Mar. 1, 1915, No. 87, 1915 Ark. Acts 87, sec. 2.
23. Id. at sec. 4.
24. Id. at sec. 10.
25. 120 Ark. 406, 179 S.W. 813 (1915).
26. Id. at 414, 179 S.W. at 816.
27. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-17-206(b), -704 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
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1. From Egypt to Hamburg
In an early case, Andrew Langstaff was stopped for allegedly
speeding through Ashley County's Egypt township, but cited into
Hamburg Municipal Court (in adjoining Carter township).28 Purporting
to contest jurisdiction, Langstaff contended that he should have been
sent to a JP court in Egypt. This plea was rejected by the Hamburg
municipal judge. On appeal, the circuit court remanded with directions
to transfer the case from Hamburg to Egypt.
The State's appeal of this order was dismissed for lack of finality,
with Justice George Rose Smith writing, "The circuit court in substance
ordered that the venue be changed to Egypt township. An order granting
or denying a change of venue is not final, for the cause still stands for
trial."29
2. War Eagle Cattle Invasion
Markham v. Evans,3" "an action to recover for room and board for
three head of cattle and damage to a meadow," started in the JP Court
of Benton County's War Eagle Township.31 According to Justice Jim
Johnson, who wrote the court's opinion, cattle that were the Evans'
"next door neighbors" were ranging on land owned by the Markhams,
who were Sebastian County residents.32 Believing "that the grass was
greener on the other side of the fence," the cattle "proceeded to invite
themselves" onto the Evans' land.33 When the Evanses "became weary
of their uninvited guests," they sued for $295 as "compensation for
their hospitality."34
The local JP issued a summons to the Sebastian County constable,
who served the Markhams.35 By special appearance, the. Markhams
then moved to quash the service of process.36 They admitted that they
owned the cattle, but denied that they (the human beings) had crossed
28. State v. Langstaff, 231 Ark. 736, 332 S.W.2d 614 (1960).
29. Id. at 737, 332 S.W.2d at 614-15 (emphasis added).
30. 239 Ark. 1154, 397 S.W.2d 365 (1965).
31. Id. at 1154-55, 397 S.W.2d at 365-66.
32. Id. at 1155, 397 S.W.2d at 366.
33. Id., 397 S.W.2d at 366.
34. Id. at 1155, 397 S.W.2d at 366.
35. Id., 397 S.W.2d at 366.
36. Markham, 239 Ark. at 1155, 397 S.W.2d at 366.
2002]
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the county line.37 The Markhams' motion to quash was dismissed and
judgment was entered against them.3"
On appeal, the Benton County Circuit Court ordered the cattle sold
at judicial sale, with the proceeds to be held in the registry of the
court.39 A revived motion to quash was granted by the circuit court
judge, leaving a lawsuit without a defendant.40 The Markhams being
out of court, the Evanses were adjudged entitled to the proceeds of the
judicial sale.4' The Markhams appealed, contending that neither the
War Eagle JP nor the Benton County Circuit Court had jurisdiction of
their persons and, thus, the judgment rendered against them, the basis
for the judicial sale, was void ab initio.42
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, finding that, under title 26,
section 305 of the Arkansas Statutes,43 a JP's jurisdiction "is coexten-
sive with the county in which he is elected or appointed, or
countywide" and a JP has jurisdiction only "within his county and may
not issue process to be served upon a defendant in any other county."
The court remanded for proceedings to determine ownership of the
money, hinting: "We view the money as standing in the stead of the
cattle."45
3. Pope-Yell Peel Appeal
46Fifteen years after Markham, Justice Smith wrote, in Peel v. Kelley,
that Markham did not "involve[] a constitutional question . . . [but]
merely construed an 1873 act, still in effect, which provides that the
jurisdiction of [JPs] shall be coextensive with the county and that the
venue shall be in the township in which the defendant resides."7 He wrote
that the statute in point "made no attempt to allow a justice of the peace
to issue process against a resident of another county; so we held he
could not do so."'
37. Id, 397 S.W.2d at 366.
38. Id., 397 S.W.2d at 366.
39. Id. at 1155-56, 39 S.W.2d at 366.
40. Id., 397 S.W.2d at 366.
41. Id., 397 S.W.2d at 366.
42. Markham, 239 Ark. at 1155-56, 39 S.W.2d at 366.
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 26-305 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947). This statute is the codification
for Act 135 of 1873, cited supra note 19.
44. Markham, 239 Ark. at 1156, 397 S.W.2d at 366.
45. Id. at 1157, 397 S.W.2d at 367.
46. 268 Ark. 90, 594 S.W.2d 11 (1980).
47. Id. at 92, 594 S.W.2d at 12.
48. Id., 594 S.W.2d at 12.
[Vol. 24
MUNICIPAL GONE DISTRICT
Peel held that a Pope County resident could sue a Yell County
resident in Pope County Municipal Court on a contract to be performed
in Yell County.49 In upholding the venue provisions of the Small
Claims Procedure Act of 1977,50 Peel may also prove noteworthy, post-
Amendment 80, for some common sense dicta:
The statutory jurisdiction of municipal courts ... need not be exactly
coextensive with the statutory jurisdiction of justices of the peace.
It may be coextensive with whatever jurisdiction could be vested in
justices of the peace ....
• .. If there is a valid basis for personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction, there has never been any reason why the legislature
cannot authorize the service of process upon a defendant outside the
court's territorial jurisdiction."
Justice Smith opined that, in fixing venue, the Small Claims
Procedure Act "necessarily contemplates correlative personal jurisdic-
tion . . . .If the statute does not authorize . . . service ...outside the
county, then the language permitting the suit to be brought in either of
two counties is meaningless" and, further, that municipal courts "have
no necessary connection with county lines."52 All in all, Peel is
49. ld. at 90, 594 S.W.2d at 11-12.
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-606 (LEXIS Repl. 1999). "When a defendant has
contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, an action based on that
obligation may be commenced and maintained either in the county where such
obligation is to be performed or in the county which the defendant resides at the
commencement of the action." Id.
51. Peel, 268 Ark. at 91-92, 594 S.W.2d at 12-13 (citing State ex. rel. Moose v.
Woodruff, 120 Ark. 406, 179 S.W. 813 (1915)). Justice Smith noted that an 1869 law
laying venue for partition actions in the county where the land is "did not specifically
say that process may be served outside the county." Id at 93, 594 S.W.2d at 13. But it
is illogical, he maintained, to conclude that an owner of an interest in land "is powerless
to obtain partition because his cotenant lives in another county." Id., 594 S.W.2d at 13.
He also cited a 1939 law that laid venue for personal injury or wrongful death in the
county of the incident or of the injured person's residence. Id., 594 S.W.2d at 13. Only
by implication did this law authorize service outside the county. Id., 594 S.W.2d at 13.
Yet, in logic, no one would believe the intent was "to destroy the remedy ... unless the
wrongdoer could be served within the county fixed as the venue." Id., 594 S.W.2d at 13.
52. Id., 594 S.W.2d at 13.
Such a court may sit in a town lying just inside a county line and having a
trade area that crosses that line. If a small grocer and his customer have a
dispute involving a charge account . . . , they may want the matter settled by
the municipal judge .... That the grocery is on one side of the county line
and the customer on the other is absolutely immaterial.
Id., 594 S.W.2d at 13.
2002]
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noteworthy for its judicious treatment of a legislative innovation de-
emphasizing the county line as a barrier to simple civil justice. Granted,
Peel was in a civil case. A different statute, with similar intent for
criminal cases, did not fare so well a few years later. 3
4. "Great Mischief' Cited
Perhaps the most notorious case on inferior court jurisdiction is
Pulaski County Municipal Court v. Scott.54 Upholding the creation of a
county municipal court, by the thinnest of margins, the supreme court
held that a county was a "municipal corporation" for purposes of
statutory eligibility to create such a court. The specifics of Scott's
holding add little to the topic at hand, but Justice Hickman's dissent is
at once both priceless and portentous:
"Municipal Corporations" is interpreted to mean "county" in this
instance, without regard to any comprehension of the Judicial
Article.
The constitution, in defining municipal corporation courts ...
provides . . . : "Corporation Courts for Cities and Towns," [not]
"cities, towns and counties." . . . [T]he great mischief behind this
case was . . .Woodruff, [where w]e held, contrary to all principles of
government, that a Little Rock Municipal Court had jurisdiction
county-wide. This is the only government entity to my knowledge
that has powers beyond its borders. That decision, however wrong
in my judgment, has been the law so long it probably cannot be
overturned. But this should not lead to the conclusion that if a city
court can have jurisdiction county-wide, a county municipal court is
justified.5
53. See Sexson v. Mun. Court of Springdale, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993);
see infra text accompanying notes 94-101.
54. 272 Ark. 115, 612 S.W.2d 297 (1981). Scott's notoriety is bottomed upon its
four opinions (never mind that the initial judge of the court involved later resigned
under a cloud of controversy and became a key figure in the now infamous federal
Whitewater investigation). Justice Frank Holt wrote for the majority; Chief Justice
Richard Adkisson concurred in a brief opinion; Justice Robert Dudley authored an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined in by Justice John Purtle; and
Justice Darrell Hickman's dissent was joined in by Justice George Rose Smith.
55. Scott, 272 Ark. at 125-26, 612 S.W.2d at 302 (1981) (Hickman, J., dissenting).
Justice Hickman may have over-hyperbolized, as title 14, chapter 56, section 413 of the
Arkansas Code, giving cities with planning commissions "territorial jurisdiction" over
land lying within five miles of their corporate limits, is a law giving a governmental
entity power beyond its borders. In later dissents, he and other jurists seem to stick to
the concept of courts not having this type of extra-territorial jurisdiction-although
Justice David Newbem's majority opinion in State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d
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5. Horns Blown from Springdale to Prairie Grove
Shortly after Scott, Roy Lee Horn and Sam Dean Horn were
arrested in Springdale, were tried and convicted in Prairie Grove
Municipal Court, and unsuccessfully appealed to Washington County
Circuit Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court. 6  Their counsel
specifically argued venue alone in the trial court. 7 The circuit judge
held that the law does not require a defendant to be charged in the court
nearest his arrest. Writing for a razor thin majority, Justice Perlesta A.
("Les") Hollingsworth noted that
appellants make an equal protection argument based on the inability
of county residents to vote for a municipal judge who has
countywide authority. The record . . . does not indicate this objection
was raised below or that the appellants stated their voting rights
were denied . . . .We will not consider matters raised for the first
time on appeal."
The court cited two sections of the Arkansas Statutes: section 22-709,' 9
for granting municipal courts countywide jurisdiction, and section 22-
721,60 for there being no "automatic right [for a] change of venue.",61
259 (1996), cites a United States Supreme Court case where a municipal court was
given jurisdiction three miles beyond its city's limits. See infra note 114.
56. Horn v. State, 282 Ark. 75,665 S.W.2d 880 (1984).
57. Id. at 76-77, 665 S.W.2d at 881. The court's opinion quoted the following
colloquy from the circuit court appeal:
The Court: Now, gentlemen, is there any stipulation as to the facts?
Are you wanting this court to resolvejurisdiction?
Mr. Murphy: Venue, Your Honor.
The Court: Venue only?
Mr. Butler: Just venue, Your Honor.
The Court: Do you want to make any stipulation as to the facts
involved? You are only wanting to challenge venue?
Mr. Murphy: I am only challenging venue. I will stipulate that one Horn
boy was 20 years of age . . .and that the license was not the proper license
on the vehicle.
The Court: That's what I'm getting at. Assuming for a minute that the
Court finds venue was improper, then that would end the matter; . . .
Mr. Murphy: I'll plead nolo. I'll go ahead and stipulate the facts; I am
not arguing on that. All I said I would fight was venue.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 77, 665 S.W.2d at 881.
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-709 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947) (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-17-206(b) (LEXIS Repl. 1999)).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-721 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947) (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-17-116 (LEXIS Repl. 1999)) (permitting a change of venue from one
2002]
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A blistering dissent from Justice Hickman was joined in by
Justices Adkisson and Purtle:
[T]he appellants challenge the power of the municipal court of...
a small community . . . in Washington County . . . to adjudicate a
criminal offense that occurred in... a large community [therein].
The problem of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts . . .
is a growing one . . . . [T]here is no constitutional or statutory
provision to regulate the proliferation of municipal courts ....
[This] will continue to cause us a problem. The municipal court in
Prairie Grove was created by Act 1171 of 1975, [with] countywide
jurisdiction . . . . Undoubtedly, the responsibilities and duties of that
court have increased, because the salary was at least tripled in
1979 ....
By what right does . . . Prairie Grove . . . cause a person
arrested in . . . Springdale, for an offense, to be subject to the
judgment of Prairie Grove? The arresting . . . deputy . . . took the
case to . . . Prairie Grove . . . [U]nder the present scheme . . . the
arresting officer decides where a person will go. It is a ridiculous
situation. In my judgment the Prairie Grove Municipal Court is not
constitutionally valid and is nothing more than a city court with
jurisdiction limited to the boundaries of the municipality; therefore,
it had no jurisdiction to try this case, and it did not have venue over an
offense committed in the City of Springdale.
I can think of no legitimate reason that a police officer could
have for arresting a person within the city limits of one city, which
has a municipal court, and transporting that person across the county
to a small town which also has a municipal court. Certainly, the
motive cannot be the administration of justice and is probably
nothing more complicated than assisting the city in raising revenue.62
6. From Pea Ridge to Rogers
Not long after Horn, Albert Tiner was charged with DWI in Pea
Ridge City Court. Losing a motion to change venue to Rogers
Municipal Court, he successfully petitioned Benton County Circuit
Court for a writ of prohibition, gaining a venue change to Rogers as
municipal court in a county to another where a prejudiced judge would prevent a fair
and impartial trial).
61. Horn, 282 Ark. at 77, 665 S.W.2d at 881.
62. Id. at 78-79, 665 S.W.2d at 881-82 (Hickman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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requested.63 The city court appealed and the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed.' 4 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Jack Holt, Jr., saw
the issue as simple: title 19, section 1102 of the Arkansas Statutes gave
the city court the jurisdiction a JP would have, but title 22, section 725
provided that a JP's jurisdiction is subject to a motion for change of
venue if violation of a state statute is charged; thus, in the factual
scenario presented, the motion to change venue automatically divested
the city court ofjurisdiction.65
Tiner stands alone as the one case where the defendant used the law
to get his case moved to a more distant court. Nevertheless, Justice
Hickman dissented, saying,
In my opinion the legislature cannot confer jurisdiction in a criminal
case upon a municipal court when the act is committed beyond its
corporate limits. That was the intent of the constitution in its scheme
of inferior courts.
The effect of the majority's decision is that an offense commit-
ted in one city can be tried in another. This is not a question of venue,
but of jurisdiction.66
7. Keeping Up with Jones
Shortly after Tiner, Timothy Jones was arrested for DWI in the
Benton County segment of Springdale and charged in Springdale
Municipal Court, in Washington County, the judge of which was
elected by "the voters of the city from both counties."67 Convicted, he
appealed to Washington County Circuit Court, where the judge granted
an oral motion for a writ of prohibition, concluding that the municipal
court had no jurisdiction over offenses occurring in Benton County.6"
Justice Hickman, writing for a unanimous court, wrote, "He was
right. ,6
9
63. City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253,254, 729 S.W.2d 399, 399 (1987).
64. Id., 729 S.W.2d at 399.
65. Id. at 254-55, 729 S.W.2d at 399.
66. Id. at 255, 729 S.W.2d at 400 (Hickman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
67. Springdale v. Jones, 295 Ark. 129, 130, 747 S.W.2d 98, 98 (1988).
68. Id., 747 S.W.2d at 98.
69. Id., 747 S.W.2d at 98 (citing ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10) ("[T]he accused shall
enjoy the right to a . . . trial . . . by impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall
have been committed ... ").
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8. From East of Elkins to West Fork
Shortly after Jones, the supreme court upheld the DWI conviction
of Billy Pschier, who ran his vehicle into a ditch "slightly east of
Elkins" (which had a municipal court); was jailed in Fayetteville
(which had a municipal court); and was then tried in West Fork
Municipal Court.70 On trial de novo in circuit court, the defendant
argued "it was prejudicial error" for him to wind up in West Fork under
those circumstances.7'
Arguments about the jurisdiction and venue of the municipal court
fell by the way, because the circuit court trial was fair (there being "no
allegation to the contrary").72 On appeal the defendant alleged that the
arresting officers had employed improper "forum shopping" and that
municipal judges who are not elected countywide should not have
jurisdiction beyond the geographical boundaries of the cities in which
they sit; however, the court did not reach those issues.
73
9. Arkansas Cannot Annex Oklahoma
Contemporaneously with Pschier, the court considered the case of
Garry Griffin, a Springdale resident, arrested for DWI in the Washing-
ton County portion of Springdale; jailed in Fayetteville; and then cited
into Elkins Municipal Court, about eighteen miles from Springdale.74
Griffin objected to venue based on the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution and title 16, chapter 85, section 201 of the
Arkansas Code, providing that, in an arrest without a warrant, a
defendant shall be taken to "most convenient magistrate" in the county
of the arrest. 75 The municipal court overruled the objections to venue,
and Griffin, convicted, appealed to circuit court, received a trial de
novo, and was again convicted.76 His appeal to the supreme court cited
the alleged errors of the municipal court.77
Justice Dudley, for the majority, noted that although the court did
not reach a decision on the question, municipal court venue may have
70. Pschier v. State, 297 Ark. 206, 206-07, 760 S.W.2d 858, 858-59 (1988).
71. Id. at 207, 760 S.W.2d at 859.
72. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 859.
73. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 859.
74. Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 209, 760 S.W.2d 852, 853 (1988).
75. Id. at 209, 760 S.W.2d at 853.
76. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 853.
77. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 853.
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been improper." However, because the defendant received a new trial
in the circuit court, with proper venue, there was no justification for
reversing the judgment.7 9 Justice Tom Glaze concurred, but was
concerned about the unanswered venue question.80
Dissenting, Justice Hickman decried "the folly a court can reap
when it will not follow the constitution.",8' Pointing to Woodruff, he said
the court "made a serious mistake in its interpretation of the constitu-
tion" by concluding "that the Little Rock and North Little Rock
municipal courts could have county-wide jurisdiction, . . . even though
the judges were only elected as city officials. 82 Woodruff's rationale,
he said, lay in affirming the legislature's grant of jurisdiction beyond
city boundaries on the basis "that the constitution did not say you
couldn't give a city court extra-territorial jurisdiction. Of course, the
constitution doesn't say that Arkansas cannot annex Oklahoma
either. 8
3
According to Justice Hickman, the Woodruff court "ignored ... the
overall scheme for lower courts and paved the way for the current
proliferation of municipal courts operating beyond the bounds of
constitutional restraints. 84  With "equal jurisdiction throughout the
county," he said, "they can get their cases merely on the basis of the
decision of the arresting officer. It is undoubtedly a one of a kind court
78. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 853.
79. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 853.
[T]hough the municipal court venue might have been erroneous, a point we
do not reach, the ... statute provides for an appeal to circuit court, where the
accused is entitled to an entirely new trial . . . . The appellant does not
question ...that he received a fair trial, with proper venue, in circuit court
' Therefore, there is no basis for reversing the judgment.
Id. at 209, 760 S.W.2d at 853.
80. Griffin, 297 Ark at 209-10, 760 S.W.2d at 853-54.
[V]enue is distinguishable from [subject matter] jurisdiction ... in that it
commonly pertains to geographical subdivisions, relates to practice and
procedure and may be waived .... [F]ive municipal courts ... in Washington
County .... [have] subject matter jurisdiction of traffic offenses .... [N]o venue
statute ... provides [that] these misdemeanor offenses must be filed in a municipal
court located within a prescribed geographical boundary.
The General Assembly's failure to provide a venue law for ... criminal
proceedings in municipal court was not argued .... [W]hat effect this omission
might have remains unanswered .... [T]he General Assembly has the authority, as
well as the responsibility, to resolve this venue question.
Id. at 210-11, 760 S.W.2d at 854 (Glaze, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 212, 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
82. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
83. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
84. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
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system."85 He then noted that our current court system was probably far
different from what was envisioned by the constitution's drafters.86
"I cannot say," Justice Hickman said, "exactly when it occurred to
some cities and counties that getting a municipal court was the thing to
do, but the idea has caught on., 87 He noted that forty-five municipal
courts had been created since 1970, owing in part to Act 240 of 1973,88
which allowed municipal courts to be established in second class cities.
In Scott, he said "we compounded our past error and approved the
creation of an entirely new court creature-a county municipal court.
That such . . . was authorized by the constitution is simply laughable."89
Judge Hickman rhetorically pondered why the deputy sheriff who
arrested Griffin in Springdale (population 25,556), took him to the
small town of Elkins (population 673), for his trial. 90 The judge then
asked:
Is this the kind of court system the drafters of the constitution
created? Nonsense.
... To me the question is jurisdiction, which we can raise on our
own. The municipal courts of Elkins and West Fork have no
jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed outside their city
limits ....
The court can ignore the problem and hope a constitutional
amendment will be passed or that these cases won't persist ....
85. Id. at 212-13, 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
86. Griffin, 297 Ark. at 212-13, 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
I can only suppose that the court in 1915 thought there would never be more
than one or... two courts in a county .... [C]ould it be seriously argued that
the court, or the drafters of the constitution, envisioned a situation like ...
present-day Pulaski County: six municipal courts, most empowered to hear
identical cases, and, with no legal means of preventing overlapping
jurisdiction, receiving their cases on the whim of the arresting officer?
Id. at 213, 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 214, 760 S.W.2d at 856 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
88. Act of Mar. 7, 1973, No. 240, 1973 Ark. Acts 240 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-17-401 to -403 (LEXIS Repl. 1999)).
89. Griffin, 297 Ark. at 214, 760 S.W.2d at 856 (Hickman, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pulaski County Mun. Court v. Scott, 272 Ark. 115, 612 S.W.2d 297 (1981)).
90. Id. at 215, 760 S.W.2d at 857 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
[Was it] because the justice was better there? I expect not. Perhaps he wanted
to help Elkins out in its revenue raising efforts. in fiscal year 1988, Elkins
collected $46,353.00 in fines. Perhaps the sheriff's office favors Elkins, or
maybe it is just a matter of spreading business around .... I cannot think of
one good reason for taking Griffin, a Springdale resident arrested in
Springdale, to the Elkins court.
Id., 760 S.W.2d at 857 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
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I get the impression," he concluded, "that . . . these are
considered little cases involving little people .... I suppose it will
take a scandal to remedy this situation . . . . [A]nytime a policeman
can decide which judge will determine the fate of the defendant,
there is an open invitation to corruption.9'
Judge Newbern added in his dissent that it was time for Arkansas
to consider moving to a different court system.
92
10. Inter/Intra-County/City?
Five years after Jones93 the supreme court voided a statute enacted
in response to that decision.94 Gina Sexson, arrested for DWI in the
Benton County part of Springdale, was convicted in that city's
municipal court, which was "situated in Washington County."'95 When
her appeal to Washington County Circuit Court was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, she asked that court for a writ to prohibit enforcement
of the judgment, arguing that title 16, chapter 17, section 206 of the
Arkansas Code, as then written-allowing an inter-county municipal
court in Springdale-was unconstitutional.96 The lower court upheld
91. Id. at 216, 760 S.W.2d at 857 (Hickman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 217, 760 S.W.2d at 858 (Newbem, J., dissenting).
Our need for a new judicial article is pressing. This is not a time for timidity
.... While I am not certain the void created by limiting municipal courts'
powers to the geographical limits of the cities they serve can be . . .readily
filled ... , I am convinced it is the price we should be willing to pay to
correct an absurd and unfair situation.
Id., 760 S.W.2d at 858 (Newbern, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
93. 295 Ark. 129, 747 S.W.2d 98 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
94. Sexson v. Mun. Court, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993).
95. Id. at 262, 849 S.W.2d at 468.
96. Id., 849 S.W.2d at 469. Section 206(b)(2) at that time provided that
[t]he jurisdiction of a municipal court shall be coextensive with the county
in which it is situated except [iun cities which are primarily located in one
county but the city limits extend into an adjacent county, the jurisdiction
shall include that portion of the city limits which extends into the adjacent
county.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-206(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1991) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-17-206(b) (LEXIS Repl. 1999)). In Jones the court had said that the Arkansas
Constitution prohibits Springdale from having jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed in Benton County. Springdale v. Jones, 295 Ark. 129, 130, 747 S.W.2d 98,
98 (1988). In Sexson the court stayed with the same reasoning:
Under our constitution the jurisdiction of our municipal courts is concurrent
with and no greater than jurisdiction of our justice of the peace courts, which
we interpret to be countywide .... [I]t is obvious that the jurisdiction of a
municipal court is confined to the county in which it is situated. [The
legislation in question, which] provides in part that the jurisdiction of
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the law; the supreme court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Jack Holt,
struck it down. 97 Denial of a prohibition writ is generally non-
appealable. However, finding that a constitutional question was
presented as to section 206(b)(2), the court treated the case as an
original prohibition cause in the supreme court and granted the writ.
98
Justice Steele Hays, in a dissenting opinion joined in by Justice
Donald Corbin, argued that the issue was "whether anything in the
Constitution of Arkansas limits the power of the legislature to extend
the territorial jurisdiction of a municipal court into an adjoining county.
The trial court held there is not and that holding was, I believe, entirely
correct." 99 The dissenters objected to the majority's overlooking Peel
(municipal court jurisdiction need not be exactly coextensive with JP
jurisdiction, but may be coextensive with whatever jurisdiction could be
vested in JPs) and Woodruff (no constitutional limitation on power to
vest jurisdiction in municipal courts beyond the geographical limits of
municipalities) in favor of one allegedly out-of-context cite:
[T]he majority limits its scrutiny of the Constitution to that brief
segment of article 7, § 40 which provides that [JPs] "shall be
conservators of the peace within their respective counties .... ." That
proviso, lifted out of context, is only one of six provisions in § 40
defining the jurisdiction [JPs] .. . . "[C]onservator of the peace" is
a term of art [that] means the judicial officer is authorized to make
arrests .... [Iln addition to the other aspects of jurisdiction listed in
§ 40, [a JP] has the power to make arrests. The intent of that
provision, read in context, is not to restrict all authority to the
territorial limits of the county ....
... [T]he legislature has the power to extend the jurisdiction of
a municipal court beyond the boundaries of the county in which it
primarily lies. I find nothing in the Constitution inconsistent with
that power and .. .we are duty bound to uphold the constitutionality
of the act .... 10o
Analyzing the legislation, Justice Hays found it to be fair in all respects
to both counties involved and, at a minimum, would have remanded
municipal courts shall be enlarged to include portions of the city limits that
extend into other counties, is unconstitutional.
Sexson, 312 Ark. at 265-66, 849 S.W.2d at 470.
97. Sexson, 312 Ark. at 265, 849 S.W.2d at 470.
98. Id. at 266, 849 S.W.2d at 470.
99. Id. at 267, 849 S.W.2d at 471 (Hays, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 267-69, 849 S.W.2d at 471-72 (Hays, J., dissenting).
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with directions to join the State as a party, so that it could be repre-
sented in a case involving the constitutionality of a statute.'Ol
11. Webb of confusion
In State v. Webb, 1°2 several defendants had been arrested for
misdemeanors allegedly committed in areas of Benton County other
than Rogers or Bentonville. 3 Cited into the municipal courts of these
two cities, the defendants successfully sought prohibition from the
Benton County Circuit Court, which held that "venue would be
improperly laid in any municipal court with respect to any offense
alleged to have occurred outside the municipality served by the court."' 4
The State appealed.
For another thin majority, Justice Newbern wrote that it was
"understandable" to call the issue venue, because the lower court was
dealing with "where a trial may be had," but he felt that the issue was
"more properly characterized as . .. territorial jurisdiction."'0 5 If "the
allegation of a charging instrument were that an offense occurred
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, then a judgment rendered
by the court would be void."'0 6 A criminal trial "must be held in the
county in which the crime was committed," subject to laws governing
changes in venue.0 7 While circuit courts are limited to trying crimes
that occur in the counties, or judicial districts, in which they sit, the
court noted, municipal courts are not so limited. "To the contrary, our
Constitution and Code both authorize a municipal court to assert
limited subject-matter jurisdiction throughout the county in which it
101. Id., 849 S.W.2d at 471-72 (Hays, J., dissenting).
102. 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d 259 (1996), supp. op. on denial of reh'g, 323 Ark. 87-A,
920 S.W.2d 1 (1996).
103. Id. at 82, 913 S.W.2d at 261.
104. Id. at 83, 913 S.W.2d at 261 (emphasis added). Compare the court's chosen
phrase, "municipality served by the court," with similar phrases in Amendment 80. E.g.,
ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 7(D) ("A District Judge may serve in one or more counties");
id § 16(D) ("All ...Judges shall be qualified electors within the geographical area
from which they are chosen, and . . .shall reside within that geographical area at the
time of election and during their period of service. A geographical area may include any
county contiguous to the county to be served when there are no qualified candidates
available in the county to be served'); id. § 17(A) ("Circuit Judges and District Judges
shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis by a majority of qualified electors voting for
such office within the circuit or district which they serve").
105. Webb, 323 Ark. at 83, 913 S.W.2d at 261 (emphasis added).
106. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 261.
107. Id.,913 S.W.2d at 261.
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sits."' ' According to Justice Newbern, "Whether the issue be . . . venue
or territorial jurisdiction, nothing in our Constitution or Code dealing
directly with the place in which misdemeanor charges must be tried
limits it to the city in which the court sits. The territorial jurisdiction of
municipal courts extends throughout the counties in which they sit."'09
The Webb appellees argued that allowing a municipal court to try
a crime occurring "outside the limits of the city in which it is situated
creates two classes of persons, one of which is denied its right to equal
protection of the laws."" Alluding to title 16, chapter 17, section
209(a) and the Arkansas Code, they argued that a candidate for
municipal judge must be
"an elector of the judicial subdivision wherein the court sits."
That is, one who is not a resident of Bentonville, for example, may
not be a candidate in the election for judge of the Bentonville
Municipal Court. Additionally, one who does not reside in
Bentonville, for example, may not vote in the election of
Bentonville's municipal judge."'
Perceiving the appellees to argue that they "would somehow be
prejudiced if they were to be tried in a court they could not help elect,"
the court emphasized that "jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases
is based on the territory in which crimes are committed and not on the
residence or voting privileges of the persons who commit the
crimes. '  Based on Griffin, the court was "not so certain that one . . .
convicted in a municipal court can get the issue of equal protection to
108. Id, 913 S.W.2d at 261. The court went onto re-affirm precedent:
Unless the organic law forbids, the Legislature may extend the jurisdiction
beyond the territorial limits of the municipalities. The authority found in the
Constitution is to vest jurisdiction in municipal courts "concurrent with the
jurisdiction of [JPs] in criminal and civil matters" .... The Constitution does
not by its express terms restrict the jurisdiction of [JPs] to the territorial
limits of the township in which they are elected to serve, therefore the
jurisdiction of municipal courts finds no such restriction in the Constitution.
Id. at 84-85, 913 S.W.2d at 262 (quoting State v. Woodruff, 120 Ark. 406, 179 S.W.
813 (1915)).
109. Id. at 85, 913 S.W.2d at 262.
110. Id.,913 S.W.2d at 262.
111. Webb, 323 Ark. at 86, 913 S.W.2d at 262 (quoting Brief for Appellees). The
appellees argued that the "result of this system is that persons not residing in a city
having a municipal court are effectively denied equal protection and due process of law
under both the United States and Arkansas Constitutions." Id.
112. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 262-63 (emphasis added, to reflect usage of the less
definitive noun territory, rather than county, district, etc.).
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us . . . after the mandatory appeal to a circuit court where the issue may
'disappear. ' 13
Notwithstanding that the court prides itself on not issuing advisory
opinions, Justice Newbern concluded with an unusual commentary:
There might be a legitimate equal protection argument . . . . but it
has not been made here . . . [,] that one class is composed of the
residents of the city . . . enfranchised to elect the municipal judge;
the other ... composed of ... residents of the county who are not so
enfranchised. Misdemeanors committed in the . . . county... outside
any city may . . . be adjudicated by a court not elected by the
residents of the place where the crime allegedly occurred. It might be
argued that citizens have a right to elect the person who tries the
cases which arise in the territory in which they reside. Such a class
of persons is obviously not contemplated in this case and is not
present. Two of the appellees are residents of Bentonville, and one
is a resident of another state." 4
"Lying beneath the challenge to county-wide jurisdiction of
municipal courts," the court continued, "is the specter of improper
forum shopping and perhaps some corruption in the process . . . . That
was the allegation in Griffin . . . and in Pschier.""' 5 Defendants in those
cases complained of being charged with offenses near one municipal-
ity, then "inexplicably cited to appear in a municipal court serving a
city some distance away."'"16 Justice Newbern opined that the court was
"unable to reach that issue because, by the time the cases reached us,
they had been the subjects of de novo trials in a circuit court where the
argument did not apply.""' 7
Apparently none of the Webb defendants complained they were
"being hailed [sic] into a court which was not the nearest to the place
where the offense occurred.""' The State conceded that "there may be
good reasons for objecting to a system which might permit improper
forum shopping," but argued that "none of them amounts to a constitu-
113. Id. at 85, 913 S.W.2d at 262.
114. Id. at 86, 913 S.W.2d at 263 (emphasis added, to reflect usage of territory and
place, rather than county, district, etc.). Such argument, the court noted, would have to
reckon with Holt Civil Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978), where an Alabama
law permitting cities to set municipal court jurisdiction three miles beyond their city
limits was held not to violate equal protection as to the citizens of the three-mile area.
Webb, 323 Ark. at 86-87, 913 S.W.2d at 263.
115. Webb, 323 Ark. at 87, 913 S.W.2d at 263.
116. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 263.
117. Id at87,913 S.W.2d at 263.
118. Id.,913 S.W.2d at 263.
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tional basis for holding a municipal court lacks jurisdiction of misde-
meanors committed in the county in which it sits but beyond the limits
of the city in which it is situated."' 9
The appellees, asking for a rehearing, claimed that the court had
erred in its equal protection "explanation" by overlooking that some of
the appellees were residents of Benton County, though not of Rogers or
Bentonville.120 In a supplemental opinion, Justice Newbern wrote:
The argument that the three ... residents of Benton County ... were
denied equal protection . . .was answered . . .by pointing out that
[criminal] jurisdiction . . .has necessarily to do with [where] the
crime is alleged to have been committed rather than the residence of
the defendant. It would be ludicrous to hold that a class of persons
consisting of defendants not enfranchised to elect the judge was
being denied equal protection . . . . We pointed out that it was
apparently not the intention of the appellees to assert they consti-
tuted such a class, as two . . .were [from] Bentonville and one ...
from another state.1
2
'
Feeling that the appellees (and Justice Glaze, author of a concurring
opinion) were missing his equal protection point, he restated it:
[A] good equal protection question might have been raised by an
"argument . . . that one class is composed of the residents of the city
who are enfranchised to elect the municipaljudge; the other.., composed
of the other residents of the county who are not so enfranchised." The
question would be whether persons residing in the county, but not in
a city served by a municipal court, would be entitled to have
allegations of criminal conduct occurring in their locality adjudicated
by a court elected by them as opposed to a court elected solely by
residents of a city.'
Saying the others had misunderstood him, he said he "did not misun-
derstand the . . .appellees, nor were any asserted facts overlooked in
our deliberation and resolution of this case."' 23
119. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 263 (emphasis added).
120. State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 87-B, 920 S.W.2d 1 (1996).
121. Id., 920 S.W.2d at 1.
122. Id., 920 S.W.2d at 1 (second emphasis added). Justice Glaze's use of the vague
term locality, rather than something more precise, reflects the frustration the justices
must have felt in dealing with these cases as to which precedent clearly indicated that
the courts in question had proper jurisdiction and venue, but as to which a certain logic,
difficult to express in words, indicated that there was something wrong in the system
somewhere.
123. Id. at 87-C, 920 S.W.2d at 1.
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Weighing in with a concurring opinion, Justice Glaze recognized
allegations sufficient to place four of the appellees in the potentially
aggrieved class.124 He felt the dispositive point was that constitutional
issues cannot be raised in a petition for writ of prohibition.1 25 He noted
that municipal court defendants had filed for a writ of prohibition,
"alleging the two municipal courts lacked county-wide venue"; that a
circuit court issued the writ; and that the state appealed.'26 As appellees,
the same defendants were arguing, he noted, that "to allow a municipal
court to hear misdemeanor actions occurring outside the city
violated . . . equal protection" and that "one who does not reside in
Bentonville may not vote in the election of Bentonville's municipal
court, and the result . . . is the persons not residing in a city having a
municipal court are effectively denied equal protection.'
' 27
Because three appellees were arrested in Bella Vista-and lived
there or in Centerton-and one was arrested "in the Gann Ridge Road
county area [and] resided in Avoca . . . these four ... had standing and
fall within the alleged violated class of persons who reside in Benton
County, and are not enfranchised to elect the municipal judge before
whom they are charged," Justice Glaze concluded. 2 ' Noting that the
State had renewed "its argument [that] defendants in criminal cases
cannot raise constitutional issues by means of a writ of prohibition,"
Justice Glaze agreed: "[Iln retrospect, our court should have rejected
the defendants' equal protection argument for this reason without
stating more.'
'1 29
C. Where the Case Law Leaves Us
This much-litigated precept holds that if a city judge presides over
an offense committed outside the city, the "no jurisdiction" defense is
not available, unless the offense occurred outside the county, even if
within the city, in which event pre-trial dismissal is without
prejudice. 3° Stated simply and realistically, the jurisprudence features
defendants (1) challenging the inferior court's venue to the inferior
court itself and losing; (2) petitioning the circuit court for a writ of
124. Id. at 87-D, 920 S.W.2d at 2 (Glaze, J., concurring).
125. Id., 920 S.W.2d at 2 (Glaze, J., concurring).
126. Webb, 323 Ark. at 87-C, 920 S.W.2d at 1 (Glaze, J., concurring).
127. Id., 920 S.W.2d at 1 (Glaze, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 87-C, 87-D, 920 S.W.2d at 2 (Glaze, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 87-D, 920 S.W.2d at 2 (Glaze, J., concurring).
130. State v. Osborn, 345 Ark. 196, 203, 45 S.W.3d 373, 377-78 (2001).
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prohibition, within which proceeding they are not allowed to raise
constitutional issues, and losing; (3) being unable to appeal at this point
because neither venue decisions (pro or con) nor denials of writs of
prohibition are final, appealable orders (and the trial de novo appeal to
circuit may cure all defects); (4) going to trial in the inferior court and
losing; (5) appealing to circuit and losing on trial de novo; (6) being
unable to raise the inferior court venue issue because the venue issue
was cured at the circuit court level; and (7) being unable to raise
constitutional issues on appeal, if the appeal is from a decision on a
writ of prohibition. In the Arkansas Supreme Court, jurisdiction
typically overtakes venue as the key issue. The nomenclature is not
consistent, but perhaps that is to be expected, as the court itself has
remarked that venue and jurisdiction "are often used interchangeably."''
Justice Newbern, in Webb, used the phrase territorial jurisdiction, as
distinguished from venue, which "deals with the place where a trial
may be had."' 32 Justice Corbin, in State v. Osborn'33 (which, though not
concerned with district court issues, may nevertheless have implica-
tions for it, based on an apparently new distinction between venue and
jurisdiction), used the phrase local jurisdiction, which "deals . . .with
where the offense is to be tried."'134 At least one Arkansas scholar,
131. Id. at 199,45 S.W.3dat 375.
132. State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 83, 913 S.W.2d 259, 261 (1996).
133. 345 Ark. 196, 45 S.W.3d 373 (2001).
134. Id. at 199, 45 S.W.2d at 375. Justice Corbin noted:
Ordinarily, venue refers to the geographic area, like a county, where an
action is brought to trial .... [J]urisdiction is generally thought of as the
power of a court to decide cases, and it presupposes control over the subject
matter and the parties . . . .One type of jurisdiction is known as local
jurisdiction [which] ..."deals only with where the offense is to be tried, not
with whether the state lacks the basic authority to apply its criminal law to
the events in question."
Id, 45 S.W.2d at 375 (citing WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §16.1(a) (2d ed.
1999)). Quite arguably, Justice Corbin virtually equated local jurisdiction with venue,
though he wrote that the Osborn facts presented "an issue of local jurisdiction, not
venue." Id., 45 S.W.2d at 375. In Osborn, the defendant was interviewed in Crawford
County about a Franklin County homicide. Id. at 198, 45 S.W.2d at 374. Alleging that
he provided false information, the State charged Osborn in Franklin County with
hindering prosecution. Id, 45 S.W.2d at 374; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-105 (Michie
Repl. 1997). The trial court held that Crawford County was the proper venue and
dismissed the case. Osborn, 345 Ark. at 199, 45 S.W.3d at 375. The supreme court
reversed, holding that because the "effects" of the offense were felt in Franklin County,
a statute providing for concurrent jurisdiction of multiple counties applied. Id. at 202-03,
45 S.W.2d at 397; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-88-108(c) (Michie 1987). No
municipal courts were involved. The effect of Osborn, though unstated in the opinion,
is that when a rule of law gives a court territorial jurisdiction, venue will always be
proper in that court. Under Osborn's facts, venue would be proper in whichever of two
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Professor John Watkins of the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville,
believes that "Justice Newbern got it exactly right . . . . Personal
jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to act. Venue is not about
power but convenience.'
1 35
Territorial jurisdiction is to a court what in personam jurisdiction is
to a defendant. The concept is that the person was in the territory when
the deed was done. For a century this jurisdiction has been co-terminal
with the county line where criminal subject matter jurisdiction of
municipal courts is concerned. Frankly, the law now seems to be that
if a trial judge calls it venue, the case is transferred; if she calls it
jurisdiction (without a qualifier), the case is dismissed (though without
prejudice). The popular, if informal, notion is that when intra-county
movement of a case occurs, venue is involved, but if inter-county
movement occurs, then jurisdiction is involved.'36
The key characteristic of venue is that it "relates to practice and
procedure and may be waived.' 37 As simple as that seems, several
cases upholding countywide jurisdiction on the basis that intra-county
case-shifting was a venue matter were 4-3 decisions, with vigorous
dissent. The theme of such dissents has been that when a law enforce-
ment agent chooses a court other than the one most logically associated
with the point of arrest, it looks like forum-shopping. 138
courts with jurisdiction handled the case. Another logical way to view the situation is
that the statute works a waiver of any venue other than that chosen by the State (i.e., the
defendant, by lying about his knowledge of events in Franklin County, waived his right
to demand a Crawford County venue on the charge of hindering prosecution).
135. E-mail from John J. Watkins, Esq., to the Honorable Vic Fleming, Little Rock
District Judge, Second Division (Aug. 22, 2001, 09:30:00 CST) (on file with author).
136. A statute that speaks of moving a case between municipal courts in the same
county refers to change of venue. ARK. CODE ANN. §16-17-116 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
Unfortunately, this is the only statute that speaks to the issue of changing venue in
district court cases, and it provides that a defendant must show almost overt prejudice
in order to be entitled to a venue change. Another statute speaks of municipal judges'
exchanging jurisdiction "[in] their respective city and county districts." Id. § 16-17-102
(LEXIS Repl. 1999). This statute provides a loose standard by which district judges
may shift their dockets among each other without regard to where cases arose or
whether the presiding judge was elected from the area in which the offense was
committed. The latter's broad wording accommodates inter- and intra-county relocation
of hearings, as well as the inter- or intra-county travel by judges to sit for each other.
I have used it to send a case to a neighboring county and to have another judge travel
to Little Rock to sit for me.
137. Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 210, 760 S.W.2d 852, 853 (1988) (Glaze, J.,
concurring).
138. Moneys collected as a result of municipal court criminal proceedings are
deposited into the treasury of the city in which the court is located and is available for
"general municipal purposes." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-119 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
Suggestions of monetary motive are less than veiled in Justice Hickman's dissents in
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This lament could be rectified by a venue statute or court rule,
mandating transfer to required geographically logical or convenient
venues on timely objection, or by a directive from the Attorney
General, directing that district court cases be prosecuted in specified
courts, based on geographical logic or convenience. Especially where
traffic cases are concerned, this would likely have satisfied the
dissenters, as traffic cases tend to produce revenue, the motive oft-cited
for why a traffic defendant stopped in one town wound up in court in
a town several miles distant.
As to non-traffic cases, a similar rule or directive governing venue
might tolerate prosecutorial flexibility for some cases, such as those
involving a particular expertise or those in which obvious economies
are served, though not to the detriment of the defendants. If legislation
implementing Amendment 80 eliminates overlapping territorial
jurisdiction of all district courts, then this entire area of discussion may
be moot in 2005. But it would not hurt to have a better rule to govern
between now and then.
Aside from the practical problems involved with re-filing a
dismissed case,'39 as opposed to transferring a non-dismissed case, had
the dissent carried the day, arguably it would have been but a Pyrrhic
victory for defendants. Presumably, in theory at least, the same charges
would re-surface in a court down the road and closer to home.
However, the dissent garnered popular support, as reflected by Acts
1118 and 1574 of 1999, requiring countywide election of municipal
judges, except in counties with a population of over 100,000.140
Griffin, Pschier, and Scott. See Griffin, 297 Ark. at 212, 760 S.W.2d at 855 (Hickman, J.,
dissenting); Pschier v. State, 297 Ark. 206, 760 S.W.2d 858 (1988) (Hickman, J.,
dissenting); Pulaski County Mun. Court v. Scott, 272 Ark. 115, 124, 612 S.W.2d 297,
301 (1981) (Hickman, J., dissenting).
139. In a traffic matter, assuming the arresting officer had jurisdiction to issue the
citation, a dismissal without prejudice in district court would involve either creating a
file in the dismissing court, retaining a certified copy of the original citation, and
returning the original citation to the issuing agency or to the local prosecuting authority
for transfer to the prosecuting authority in the appropriate jurisdiction, or, if the
dismissing court retained the citation without accommodation to the prosecuting
authority, the drafting of an affidavit for an arrest warrant for processing in the
appropriate jurisdiction, issuance and service of the warrant, etc.
140. Act of Apr. 15, 1999, No. 1574, 1999 Ark. Acts 1574 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-17-120 (LEXIS Repl. 1999)); Act of Apr. 5, 1999, No. 1118, 1999 Ark.
Acts 1118 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-130 (LEXIS Repl. 1999)). The bills
from which these acts grew were introduced on short notice in the 1999 General
Assembly, prompting an inquiry to their sponsors, who candidly stated that certain
residents of smaller counties who lived outside the voting parameters of certain
municipal judges in their counties believed they should have the right to vote on the
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The "system" long ago should have acted on this issue. If it is a
venue matter-involving practice and procedure-the executive or
judicial branch could have adopted a governing rule. If it is a jurisdic-
tional matter-involving a judge's right to exercise authority 4 -the
legislative branch could have enacted a more efficient statutory
arrangement. Under Amendment 80, the legislature continues to have
sole authority to establish territorial jurisdiction in criminal matters; the
Supreme Court arguably has concurrent authority to govern venue.
A century of controversial case law bears the message that
Arkansas can do better, beckoning the bar to take the lead. The passage
of Amendment 80 gives presents the opportunity that we must not pass
up.
III. AMENDMENT 80
As discussed above, the key historical issue has been whether a
person arrested in an area served by one inferior court may rightfully
be haled into an inferior court of a different area, a court whose judge
was elected by residents of an area in which the offense, whether
traffic-related or otherwise, was not committed. Eight sections of
Amendment 80, the state's new judicial article, bear on this narrow
issue.
Section 3 provides: "The Supreme Court shall prescribe the rules
of pleading, practice and procedure for all courts." '42 Section 4 provides
municipal judge before whom they might have to appear. That the solution employed
was to expand the universe of municipal judge electors, rather than mandate that law
enforcement file cases in geographically logical venues is ironic. The irony is
highlighted by federal court precedent, approving circuit court "electoral sub-districts,"
in which minority voters, constituting a majority of residents, elect judges who then
expressly have territorial jurisdiction exceeding the geography of the area that elects
them. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 1991 WL 256900 (Ark. App. Nov. 7, 1991); see also Holt
Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978) (applying Alabama law allowing
municipal court jurisdiction three miles beyond city limits, holding that residents of
unincorporated community had no constitutional right to participate in political
processes of city simply because they were subject to its police and sanitary
regulations).
141. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines jurisdiction
as "a court's power to decide a case or issue a decree," and provides over two pages of
definitions for the word and for phrases encompassing the word. I have intentionally
avoided extensive definition of this basic term, assuming the reader to know and
understand the basic distinctions among in personam, in rem, and subject matter
jurisdiction.
142. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
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that the Supreme Court "shall exercise general superintending control
over all courts of the state."'
143
Section 7(B) provides that district courts "shall have original
jurisdiction, concurrent with Circuit Courts, of misdemeanors, and shall
also have such other criminal jurisdiction as may be provided pursuant
to Section 10."' 44 Section 7(C) provides that there "shall be at least one
District Court in each county. If there is only one District Court in a
county, it shall have county-wide jurisdiction."' 141 Section 10 grants the
legislature "power to establish jurisdiction . . . and venue" of district
courts.1
46
Section 16(D) provides that district judges
shall be qualified electors within the geographical area from which
they are chosen, and . . . shall reside within that geographical area at
the time of election and during their period of service. A geograph-
ical area may include any county contiguous to the county to be
served when there are no qualified candidates available in the county
to be served. 147
Section 17(A) provides that district judges "shall be elected on a
nonpartisan basis by a majority of qualified electors voting for such
office within the circuit or district which they serve."'4 Section
19(B)(2) provides that district courts "shall have the jurisdiction vested
in" all inferior courts. 149
143. Id. § 4.
144. Id. § 7(B).
145. Id. § 7(C).
146. Id. § 10.
147. Id. § 16(D). The term geographical area is, if nothing else, a far less definitive
term than analogous nouns of common usage (city, township, county, district, etc.). It
seems intended to provide flexibility in areas where the case law has disallowed
reasoned solutions to practical problems-such as where a city is located on a county
line-without abrogating the provision that there be at least one court per county. It will
be interesting to see how that term develops. While I have omitted any significant
discussion of this section in the text, suffice it to say that, somehow, this section factors
into the reasoning of those who hold that Amendment 80 repealed countywide
jurisdiction of municipal courts.
148. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 17(A). For those who argue that Amendment 80
repealed countywide jurisdiction, the phrase majority of electors within the district they
serve triggers a thought pattern envisioning a boundary within which all voters (in the
judge's election) live and within which a crime must occur for that judge to have
jurisdiction over the perpetrator. However, I believe this section's sole significance lies
in its changing the electoral quantum, from plurality to majority, for district court
judges.
149. Id. § 19(B)(2).
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One interpretation is that Amendment 80 answers the issue in the
negative, that defendants may no longer stand for trial, or any other
judicial proceeding, in a court whose judge was not elected by the
voters of the district within which the crime occurred. The rationale for
this school of thought is that the word jurisdiction in section 19(B)(2)
refers to subject matter jurisdiction only and, therefore, beginning in
2005, a district judge's authority to hear criminal cases, under section
7(B), will be limited, under sections 7(C) and 17(A), to those arising
within the district in which her electors reside.
Another interpretation is that Amendment 80 did not really effect
a change as to the issue, leaving the resolution, or lack thereof,
suggested by the case law. The rationale for this mode of thinking is
that section 19(B)(2)'s use of the word jurisdiction is broader, elaborat-
ing upon earlier stated concepts; that it encompasses subject matter,
personal, territorial, and whatever other type of jurisdiction there may
be, and, therefore, the status quo of countywide jurisdiction prevails,
until legislation or court rule states otherwise. Stated differently,
section 7(B)'s language, "shall have original jurisdiction . . . of
misdemeanors [and] such other criminal jurisdiction as may be
provided,"15 is so clearly a grant of subject matter jurisdiction that the
later language of section 19 cannot be concerned with that topic, as
such would be needlessly redundant. Through the logic of the language
and the overall linguistic flow of the amendment, section 19(B)(2)'s
significance lies in its emphasis that district courts will usurp all other
inferior courts, as regards the all-inclusive concept ofjurisdiction."5'
To explore the two theories, one must examine whether Amend-
ment 80 supersedes Arkansas Code Annotated title 16, chapter 17,
section 206's grant of countywide jurisdiction to district courts.'52
Section 10 grants the legislature "power to establish jurisdiction . . .
and venue" of district courts.153 That seems a logical place to look for
language repealing this statute, whether in response to case law or
otherwise. While Section 10 seems to address some case-related
150. Id. § 7(B).
151. See supra note 141.
152. See supra note 9.
153. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 10.
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issues, 114 it seems devoid of express intent to override prior law on this
point.
However, section 206 has been upheld on the basis of the 1874
Constitution's "Old Judicial Article," which now stands repealed by
Amendment 80. Other Amendment 80 language arguably is inconsis-
tent with section 206. So, a legitimate issue is whether it was implicitly
repealed. If the legislature were, for instance, to enact a law providing
for citywide election of certain district judges, but establish territorial
jurisdiction as the city's planning jurisdiction (five miles out from the
city limits or half way to the next city),'55 effectively establishing an
arrangement similar to the one upheld in Holt,'56 would that Act
withstand a challenge?
The Honorable David Stewart, my colleague on the district court
bench in Little Rock, would say no. He believes that section 7(C) of the
amendment impliedly repealed section 206, reasoning that if there is
only one district court in a county, it has countywide jurisdiction "in
every respect . . . venue, territory, jurisdiction, election and service"
and that this "logically [implies] that if the county has two ...or more
separate district courts, those courts also have separate areas that define
and restrict venue, territorial jurisdiction, service and election.' ' 57
That interpretation is logical and easy to embrace. I certainly do
not oppose it. It naturally falls into place if the intent of the amendment
was to adopt the dissenting view in the case law. Judge Stewart is not
alone in his belief that this was part of the intent. However, I submit
that this intent is difficult to find in the language of Amendment 80. I
also submit that if this is the proper interpretation, then it becomes a
real chore for the legislature to fashion a plan calling for any district
courts in the state to have overlapping jurisdictions, unless, in those
geographic areas, a venue rule is imposed. Otherwise, there will be the
appearance of revenue-oriented court selection, at least in some
instances. History teaches that traffic cases will be the focal point of
154. Section 10 provides that the legislature is to establish districts and the
appropriate number of judges for each, districts to be composed of "contiguous
territories." This provision, read with Section 7(D) ("A District Judge may serve in one
or more counties") vis-A-vis Springdale v. Jones, 295 Ark. 129, 747 S.W.2d 98 (1988),
and Sexson v. Municipal Court, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993), addresses the need
in cities on county lines.
155. ARK. CODEANN. § 14-56-413 (Michie Repl. 1998).
156. See supra note 114.
157. Letter from the Honorable David Stewart, Little Rock District Judge, Third
Division, to Honorable Vic Fleming, Little Rock District Judge, Second Division (Aug.
6, 2001) (on file with author).
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forum-shopping allegations. If Amendment 80's intent was to repeal
countywide jurisdiction, then surely its intent also was to eliminate "the
specter of improper forum shopping."' 8
The end of having a judge sit primarily on cases arising from areas
consisting of his electors is achievable. But in my opinion, Amendment
80 alone did not achieve this end. The General Assembly may enact
legislation establishing district court jurisdiction coextensive only with
the respective districts of the courts. Unless it does so, however, I
submit that countywide jurisdiction'59 will continue to be the rule. Even
if it does so, there is the possibility for some overlapping jurisdictions,
such as areas in which one judge is elected countywide and one or
more others elected citywide.
Arguably, a joint reading of sections 10, 3, and 4 of Amendment
80 reflect a grant to the supreme court of express concurrent authority
with the legislature over venue. While venue statutes are sprinkled
throughout the state and federal codes,16° venue also may be the topic
of procedural rules.'
61
158. State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 86, 913 S.W.2d 259, 263 (1996), supp. op. on denial
ofreh'g, 323 Ark. 87-A, 920 S.W.2d 1 (1996).
159. See supranote 9.
160. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (governing in general all civil
actions in United States District Court); id. § 1965 (1994) (governing venue in RICO
cases); 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(4) (1994) (specifying for states to file civil actions against
unlawful telephone solicitors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-317 (Michie Repl. 1997)
(permitting venue in Pulaski County Probate Court, Ninth Division, for some persons
committed to DHS custody; requiring venue for some who have been conditionally
released to be in probate court of the county where the person currently resides); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-60-109 (Michie 1987) (permitting venue of contract actions against
nonresident in county of plaintiffs residence when claim arose); id. § 16-60-202
(Michie 1987) (specifying no venue change in civil actions unless necessary for
impartial trial); id. § 23-32-1505 (LEXIS Repl. 2000) (permitting foreign investor
companies to sue and be sued in county of residence of any party to the suit; where land
is involved, venue shall be in the county where land is located); id. § 28-40-102 (Michie
1987) (governing venue for probate and administration of will); id. § 28-65-202 (Michie
1987) (governing venue for appointment of guardian). This list is far from complete.
Searches for "venue" on electronic legal research servers produce dozens of statutes that
contain the word.
161. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. Rule 18 provides the following:
Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution
shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed. The court shall
fix the place of trial within the district with due regard to the convenience of
the defendant and the witnesses and the prompt administration ofjustice.
Id. A search of Arkansas court rules for "venue" reflects only seven that contain the
word: ARK. R. CRIM. P. 21.3 (stating that two or more offenses are "related" if, inter alia,
"within the jurisdiction and venue" of same court); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.9 (deeming
defendant who requests transfer of charges to waive "venue as to an offense committed
in another governmental unit of the state" when pleading to offenses committed in other
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There is no statute mandating venue for criminal cases in district
courts.162 Absent a statute in an area of concurrent authority, the court
may promulgate a rule. The Attorney General, by a directive to all
prosecutors, could accomplish the desired end less formally.
If 2005 finds any of our state's district courts with overlapping
territorial jurisdiction, then a venue statute, rule of court, or prosecuto-
rial edict will be needed to bring about optimum fairness.
IV. SUBJECT MATTrER JURISDICTION
The new district courts are to be "trial courts of limited jurisdiction
as to amount and subject matter, subject to the right of appeal to Circuit
Courts for a trial de novo.' ' 163 Limited subject matter jurisdiction, both
civil and criminal, reflects the status quo, along with a civil case
"jurisdictional amount,"' 64  five-thousand dollars, within which
jurisdiction has been concurrent with circuit courts.
However, the new district courts' jurisdictional amount and subject
matter of civil cases "shall be established by Supreme Court rule."'
165
This concept is new. Determination of civil jurisdiction will be the
exclusive province of the supreme court. Effecting changes in this area
will henceforth involve a different process 166 from that of passing
legislation. Depending on how the Court chooses to employ this power,
significant changes are possible at the inferior court level.
A. Circuit Court Backlog
Civil cases that have caused circuit court backlogs may merit
concurrent jurisdiction in district court. Docket overcrowding and a
faster track to case disposition are both goals that considerable effort
has gone into in recent years. Whether they were expressly among the
jurisdictions); ARK. R. CIV. P. 8, 12, 82; ARK. INF. CT. R. 2 ("These rules shall not be
construed to extend or affect the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ...or the venue of
actions therein"); ARK. SUP. CT. P. REGULATING PROF'L CONDUCT § 5K (providing venue
for attorney disbarment proceedings).
162. Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 210-11, 760 S.W.2d 852, 854 (1988) (Glaze, J.,
concurring).
163. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 7(A).
164. ARK. CONST. amend. 64; ARK. CODEANN. § 16-17-704 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
165. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 7(B).
166. The process for the supreme court's promulgation of a rule is, as best I can tell,
not reduced to a formulaic process. Thus, any suggestion I might make regarding how
to employ it would be speculative. There are committees in place as to most sets of
rules, and membership of those committees is a matter of public record.
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problems that Amendment 80 was intended to solve, this opportunity
must not be overlooked.
B. Real Estate Cases
In the Arkansas Code, title 16, chapter 17, section 206(a)'s
provision that "Municipal courts . . . shall not have jurisdiction in civil
cases where a lien on land or title or possession thereto is involved" is
arguably at odds with the provision that the supreme court may
"establish" subject matter jurisdiction of district court civil cases. This
statute, thus, may impliedly have been repealed, portending that district
courts might be accorded jurisdiction in real estate matters that
otherwise fall into their subject matter jurisdiction and within their
jurisdictional amount.
There is precedent for a court rule to override a statute in matters
of practice and procedure, but not in areas of substance, such as the
conferring of subject matter jurisdiction.'67 However, the Arkansas
Constitution now gives the court the authority to confer civil subject
matter jurisdiction.
C. Felonies
District courts are to have original jurisdiction over misdemeanors
and "such other criminal jurisdiction as may be provided pursuant to
Section 10 of this Amendment."' 68 Under the repealed judicial article
of the 1874 Constitution, municipal courts were without jurisdiction to
try felony cases.'69 It is now plausible that some degree of felony
jurisdiction will devolve upon district courts.
Especially given the model of United States Magistrate Courts, it
makes sense that felony defendants be allowed to enter guilty pleas and
be sentenced in district court. It also makes sense that a felony
defendant be allowed to plead not guilty in district court, with the case
then passing expeditiously to a circuit judge's trial docket. Why arraign
a defendant twice?
Bond set by a district court would be subject to review by the
circuit court. District judges could even be employed to handle pre-trial
167. See State v. Lester, 343 Ark. 662, 38 S.W.3d 318 (2001); Curtis v. State, 301
Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).
168. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 7(B).
169. See McGrew v. State, 338 Ark. 30, 991 S.W.2d 588 (1999); McArthur v.
Pulaski County Circuit Court, 253 Ark. 501, 488 S.W.2d 5 (1972).
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discovery and evidentiary matters, an innovation that could enhance
efficiency and expedite case progress, especially in rural areas where
circuit judges are not in court on a daily basis, although this arrange-
ment would require some creative thinking by the supreme court as it
fashions its rules and administrative orders in the wake of Amendment
80.
D. Jury Trials?
May the Arkansas Supreme Court empower district courts to hold
jury trials, thus overriding title 16, chapter 17, section 703 of the Code,
which provides that "[tihere shall be no jury trials in municipal
court"? 7 ' The answer to this question will hinge on how the phrase
"subject to the right of appeal to Circuit Courts for a trial de novo" in
section 7(B) of Amendment 80 is interpreted, as well as whether the
implementation of jury trials might be considered a matter of practice
or fall within the realm of general superintending control.
To characterize the right to trial by jury as a matter of practice that
would be subject to the court's superintending authority is probably out
of kilter with the spirit of the common law. It assuredly has always
been assumed that only the legislature has the authority to grant or
encroach upon this vital right. In my opinion, the legislature could
authorize jury trials in district court, but the supreme court could not.
The legislature has had this power, but has opted not to implement jury
trials in inferior courts.
Amendment 80 does not seem inconsistent with section 703. In
specifying "trial de novo" as the appellate right at the circuit court
level, Amendment 80 perpetuates the doctrine that has sustained the
statutory scheme of exclusively bench trials at the inferior court
level.17' In my opinion, no one has a right to demand that jury trials be
available in district courts, since the right to jury trial is preserved at
the circuit court level on appeal.
If, in some manner, jury trials were allowed in district courts, other
issues arise. May a de novo appeal to circuit court be something less
than another trial? Could a district court jury trial be reviewed by a
circuit court on the record, in the de novo manner that chancery matters
are reviewed by the appellate courts? (Chancery matters, of course,
were always bench trials.) Is the right to a trial de novo in circuit court
170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-703 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
171. See State v. Roberts, 321 Ark. 31, 900 S.W.2d 175 (1995).
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waivable in the event litigants opt for a jury trial in district court and,
if so, then might an appeal to circuit be handled on less than a de novo
standard of review?
Pondering the potential, I can only envision that many of us may
have to become more willing to work with others in circumstances
where we have been accustomed to working without others. Society's
needs for common sense, practical wisdom, and creativity from the
judiciary were not repealed by Amendment 80. Nor was the appropri-
ateness of teamwork and innovation in the judicial process.
V. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the foregoing discussion raises more questions than
it answers. But the issues discussed in this article are concerned with
the grass roots of the judicial system and, as such, deserve the attention
of the entire bar. The passage of Amendment 80 was a watershed
event, a dividing point between how things used to be and how they
should be. Whether or not an Arkansas lawyer is a regular practitioner
in district court, he or she should reflect on the discussion above and
get involved at one level or another as this discussion wends its way
toward the final law-making process.
We of the legal profession in Arkansas have an awesome opportu-
nity and responsibility to re-build a court system. We know the areas
that have evoked negative criticism in the past. If we do not learn from
the lessons of history, to twist an adage, we are destined to go there
again. I encourage all Arkansas attorneys and law students to get
involved in this effort to build a new district court system with
intelligence, common sense, and pride. Let's make it work.
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